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I. Introduction 
It seems that everybody loves workplace wellness programs. The 
Chamber of Commerce has firmly endorsed those programs, as have other 
business groups.1 So has President Obama, and even liberal firebrands like 
former Senator Tom Harkin.2 And why not? After all, what’s not to like 
about programs that encourage people to adopt healthy habits like 
exercise, nutritious eating, and quitting smoking? The proponents of these 
programs speak passionately, and with evident good intentions, about 
reducing the crushing burden that chronic disease places on individuals, 
families, communities, and the economy as a whole.3 
What’s not to like? Plenty. Workplace wellness programs are often 
well-intentioned, and they are certainly pushed forward by an industry of 
consultants who offer data that are facially convincing regarding their 
value. But many workplace wellness programs push—if not exceed—the 
boundaries of the law. A growing body of evidence indicates that reliance 
 
†  Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to 
the hosts of this symposium for inviting my contribution, and to Sarah Scheinman 
for able research assistance. 
1. See Ronald Loeppke, Wrap-Up, in WINNING WITH WELLNESS 25 (2016). 
2. Tom Harkin, Health Care, Not Sick Care, 19 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 1, 2 (2004); 
Marianne Levine, Obamacare’s “Wellness” Gamble, POLITICO (May 13, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/agenda/agenda/story/2016/05/wellness-obamacare-
000114. 
3. See The Healthcare Leadership Council and the Congressional Wellness Caucus 
Hold Briefing Titled “How Private Sector Wellness and Prevention Initiatives Are 
Showing Quantifiable Results in Improving Health and Lowering Healthcare 
Costs.”, HIGHBEAM RESEARCH (Mar. 24, 2012), 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2617209161.html; Mehmet Oz & Mike 
Roizen, Drs. Oz and Roizen: Five Secrets to Get Healthy at Work, BUFFALO NEWS (Apr. 
2, 2016), http://www.buffalonews.com/columns/drs-oz-and-roizen/drs-oz-and-
roizen-five-secrets-to-get-healthy-at-work-20160402. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
The EEOC, the ADA, and Workplace Wellness Programs 
82 
on workplace wellness programs to reduce the burden of disease is bad—
and likely futile—health policy. Although those programs may work well in 
shifting health costs to sicker employees, this body of evidence indicates 
that they are unlikely to actually improve health in any significant way.4 And 
workplace-wellness programs give employers a power over their workers’ 
private lives that we ought not to allow. Elsewhere, I have argued that, as a 
matter of privacy and social equality, employers should not be permitted to 
leverage their economic power over employees as a means of controlling 
the aspects of workers’ out-of-work lives that wellness programs affect.5 
The remainder of this paper elaborates on the first of these points. I 
focus on an important recent episode in the regulation of workplace-
wellness programs—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(“EEOC” or “Commission”) adoption of new rules governing those programs 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).6 The Commission 
promulgated those rules in a fraught political environment.7 It had recently 
brought three suits that offered hints that it would aggressively challenge 
workplace wellness programs under the ADA.8 After a business backlash to 
those suits, the White House reportedly pressured the Commission to 
reverse its stance; the new regulations, which came out after that 
controversy, would significantly loosen restrictions on wellness programs.9 
 
4. See, e.g., Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings 
Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 468, 469, 471-72 
(2013); Alfred Lewis et al., Employers Should Disband Employee Weight Control 
Programs, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e91 (2015); Sharon Begley, Do Workplace 
Wellness Programs Improve Employees’ Health?, STAT (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/19/workplace-wellness-programs-
employee- health/; see generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care As an 
Incentive for Healthy Behavior? An Assessment of the Affordable Care Act’s 
Personal Responsibility for Wellness Reforms, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 635, 640–41 
(2014) (arguing that “personal responsibility reforms” like wellness programs 
“reflect cultural biases that exaggerate the extent to which ill health is attributable 
to the personal failings of unhealthy individuals and that they serve as a political 
distraction from less punitive measures aimed at making our communities, 
workplaces, schools, and marketplaces more conducive to healthy living”). 
5. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
225, 252–53 (2013). 
6. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d) (2016). 
7. See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, EEOC Issues New Rules for Wellness Programs, 
WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2016 5:20 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eeoc-issues- 
new-rules-for-wellness-programs-1463433655. 
8. E.E.O.C. v. Orion Energy Sys. Inc., 145 F. Supp. 3d 841, 841-42 (E.D. Wis. 2015); 
E.E.O.C. v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015); E.E.O.C. v. 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. CIV. 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 5795481 at *1 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 6, 2014). 
9. See Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126 
(May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630); Jonathan Cohn, Big Business 
Gets a Win on Controversial Workplace Wellness Plans, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 
2015, 10:28 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/workplace-
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In particular, the regulations would allow employers to impose a significant 
financial cost—up to thirty percent of the total cost of self-only health 
coverage—on workers who refuse to submit private medical information as 
part of wellness programs.10 
Part II discusses the legal questions that workplace wellness programs 
present under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In that part, I argue that 
the ADA, properly construed, would prohibit common elements of 
workplace-wellness programs. In particular, the ADA requires medical 
disclosures as part of a workplace-wellness program to be “voluntary;” I 
argue that the best interpretation of that voluntariness requirement would 
prohibit employers from imposing any financial incentives on employees to 
reveal private medical information. Part III discusses the EEOC’s recent 
regulations. I argue that those regulations not only fail to incorporate the 
best interpretation of “voluntary,” but also fail to incorporate any 
reasonable interpretation of the term—and, indeed, barely try to interpret 
the term at all. Thus, I argue that the new regulation’s thirty-percent rule 
should be invalidated. Part IV is a brief conclusion. 
II. Workplace Wellness Programs and the ADA’s Voluntariness 
Requirement 
Much of the legal architecture and terminology classifying wellness 
programs comes from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”) as amended by the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)11 and the 
regulations implementing those statutes.12 Under the HIPAA/ACA regime, 
workplace-wellness programs come in two basic flavors, and the law 
imposes distinct regulations on each flavor. What the law calls participatory 
wellness programs provide some incentive or opportunity to participate in 
an activity that the employer deems healthy.13 Examples might include a 
discount on membership in a gym, free participation in a smoking-cessation 
program (perhaps with some additional reward for participation), or 
incentives to obtain health screenings and education in healthy habits.14 
What the law calls health-contingent wellness programs condition 
incentives on achievement of some health-related factor.15 The factor can 
be either completion of a health-related activity, such as an exercise or  
wellness-eeoc_n_7083506.html; Jonathan Cohn, Obama is Smack in the Middle of 
a Brewing Fight Over Workplace Wellness, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2015, 9:00 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/14/workplace-wellness-
obama_n_684256.html. 
10. See infra notes 88 – 107 and accompanying text. 
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012). 
12. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1 (2016). 
13. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii) (2016). 
14. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii) (2016). 
15. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(iii) (2016). 
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smoking-cessation program (the law calls such a wellness plan “activity-
based”), or the achievement of a health outcome, such as losing weight or 
quitting smoking (the law calls such a wellness plan “outcome-based”).16 
HIPAA, as amended by the Affordable Care Act, contained a number of 
requirements for health-contingent wellness programs, though it did not 
meaningfully restrict participatory wellness programs.17 But both sorts of 
programs give rise to significant disability-discrimination concerns, even if 
they fully comply with the regulations the ACA put into place. For one thing, 
wellness programs might be constructed in ways that directly impose 
barriers to participation by workers with particular kinds of disabilities. If an 
employer incentivizes workers to participate in or complete an exercise 
class, but that class is held in a facility that is not accessible to persons who, 
say, use wheelchairs, then wheelchair users cannot receive the incentive. If 
an employer incentivizes the achievement of an outcome standard that an 
individual, because of her disability, cannot satisfy, that decision, too, will 
exclude individuals with disabilities. 
Key provisions of the ADA target employer practices that exclude 
workers with disabilities in this way. In particular, the statute requires an 
employer to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,” 
unless that employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”18 As a result 
of this provision, an employer who sets up a wellness program that imposes 
barriers to workers with disabilities must make a reasonable 
accommodation—such as by moving an exercise class to an accessible 
space or giving disabled workers an alternative means of satisfying the 
requirements of a health-contingent program—so long as that does not 
impose an undue hardship. Fortunately, this principle is uncontroversial, 
even if its application to particular wellness-program rules may not be. The 
recent EEOC regulations specifically require reasonable accommodation in 
circumstances like this,19 and the ACA imposes parallel requirements.20 
The disability-discrimination issues do not end there, however. Many 
wellness programs require workers, as condition of participating and 
receiving whatever incentive is attached, to provide private medical 
information to their employers or to the contractor that administers the 
program.21 But as Congress learned during its consideration of the ADA, 
employers have often, upon learning about individuals’ disabling 
 
16. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(iv), (v) (2016). 
17. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(3)-(5) (2016). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2016). 
19. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,141. 
20. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(3)(iv), (4)(iv) (2016). 
21. See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Employer Wellness Programs Are A Great Idea—Right?, 
NATION (June 1, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/employer-wellness-
programs-are-a-great-idea-right/. 
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conditions, drawn overbroad conclusions about the limiting effects of those 
conditions and either fired or refused to hire individuals with those 
conditions.22 Researchers and disability-rights activists have long noted the 
existence of a spread effect, in which people reflexively think that an 
impairment that limits some physical or mental functions is more broadly 
disabling.23 The stereotypes and fears that attach to many hidden 
disabilities—disabilities that are not immediately obvious to observers—
may be even greater than those that attach to more obvious disabilities.24 
To address this issue, Congress constructed a complex set of rules 
regarding when an employer may ask for or receive medical information 
from an applicant or employee.25 The ADA adopts different rules for each 
of three stages of application and employment. First, during the job 
application process and prior to the extension of an offer of employment, 
an employer “shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of 
a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability 
or as to the nature or severity of such disability.”26 At that stage, the 
employer may ask an applicant about her “ability . . . to perform job-related 
functions,” but not about what disabilities or medical conditions she has. 27 
After an employer has extended a conditional offer of employment, the 
rules for the second stage kick in. At that stage, an employer may require a 
full medical examination, so long as all entering employees—or, at least, all 
entering employees in a particular job category—must undergo the same 
examination.28 The results of such an examination must be kept 
confidential, though they may be shared with supervisors and emergency 
personnel as relevant to determine necessary work restrictions or 
emergency medical services.29 
The rules governing medical examinations and inquiries at the first two 
stages of hiring and employment serve to create a record of discrimination. 
If an employer was willing to extend a conditional offer of employment at 
the first stage, when it did not know of a worker’s medical conditions, and 
then revoked that offer after learning of those medical conditions at the 
second stage, the obvious conclusion is that the employer acted because of 
those conditions. For employees with hidden disabilities, the first two 
stages thus help to avoid the most difficult problem for most claims of hiring 
 
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at *50 (1990). 
23. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 423-24 (2000). 
24. See id. at 492-494. 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2012). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2012). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (2012). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2012). 
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discrimination—proving that a protected characteristic, and not some 
other factor, caused the refusal to hire.30 
Despite the medical examination permitted after a conditional offer of 
employment, many employees’ disabilities will remain hidden. Many 
employers choose not to require medical examinations at the time of hire.31 
And many hidden disabilities develop after an employee starts work. To 
protect workers with hidden disabilities at the third stage of the 
relationship, Congress provided that an employer 
shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries 
of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a 
disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such 
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.32 
On its face, this provision would impose significant limitations on 
participatory wellness programs that incentivize workers to provide 
medical information. If an employer either requires a medical examination 
or even makes an “inquir[y]” regarding disability—an inquiry the employee 
could refuse to answer—the general rule requires the employer to show 
that the examination or inquiry satisfies the relatively stringent “job-related 
and consistent with business necessity” standard.33 
Wellness programs existed in 1990, and, just as today, they were 
extremely popular with members of Congress and other elites.34 
Accordingly, the ADA provided an exception to the job-related/business-
 
30. See, e.g., Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-
Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2008) (“Employment 
discrimination cases are difficult to prove, especially since few cases turn up 
‘smoking gun’ evidence of discrimination.”). 
31. See, e.g., Donald H. Stone, Pre-Employment Inquiries: Drug Testing, Alcohol 
Screening, Physical Exams, Honesty Testing, Genetics Screening—Do They 
Discriminate? An Empirical Study, 25 AKRON L. REV. 367, 367 (1991). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). 
33. Nobody knows exactly what “job-related and consistent with business 
necessity”—”which combine[s] relatively lenient language (‘job related,’ 
‘consistent with’) with stringent language (‘business necessity’)”—means. See 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and 
Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1115, 1140 (2016). But employers are understandably unwilling to rest the 
validity of their wellness programs on satisfying the standard. 
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (Pt. II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1990) (“A growing 
number of employers today are offering voluntary wellness programs in the 
workplace. These programs often include medical screening for high blood 
pressure, weight control, cancer detection, and the like. As long as the programs 
are voluntary and the medical records are maintained in a confidential manner 
and not used for the purpose of limiting health insurance eligibility or of 
preventing occupational advancement, these activities would fall within the 
purview of accepted activities.”). 
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necessity requirement for “voluntary medical examinations, including 
voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee health program 
available to employees at that work site.”35 That exception, and particularly 
the voluntariness requirement that it imposes, has been the focus of the 
recent legal controversies regarding workplace-wellness programs.36 
Voluntariness is an extremely contested concept in the law. Webster’s 
defines “voluntary” as “proceeding from the will or from one’s own choice 
or consent” or “unconstrained by interference.”37 But, of course, all choices 
are made under constraint.38 A voluntariness requirement thus cannot 
demand that a choice be free from all constraint or influence. Rather, a 
determination that a choice is voluntary is necessarily a normative 
judgment that the constraints under which that particular choice was made 
are neither so great, nor of a sufficiently problematic type, for the law to 
vitiate the choice. How one makes that normative judgment might depend 
on considerations that are specific to the context in which a particular 
choice is made, on one’s broader normative commitments, or both. For 
example, a strong believer in a conventional libertarian understanding of 
freedom of contract might say that, in the absence of force, fraud, or 
perhaps an unusual degree of monopsony power, any condition imposed 
by an employer on an employee is voluntary; after all, the worker can 
always refuse the condition and look for another job.39 Others might find a 
lack of voluntariness precisely because it can be so difficult to find work 
elsewhere if one loses one’s job.40 Still others might find a work condition 
inconsistent with voluntariness because it exceeds a normative limitation 
on the proper power of employers. For example, I have argued that, as a 
matter of social equality, employers should not be permitted to leverage 
the economic power they have over workers to control their out-of-work 
lives.41 
Although normative considerations like these are key to understanding 
and applying a voluntariness requirement, they rarely appear on the face of 
 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (2012). 
36. E.g. Michelle Andrews, Government Says Bosses Can’t Force Workers To Get 
Health Tests, NPR (Dec. 2, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2014/12/02/367842386/government-says-bosses-cant-force-workers-to-
get-health-tests (discussing the EEOC’s lawsuit in Honeywell International). 
37. Voluntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/voluntary (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
38. See generally Martha Minow, Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, 80 GEO. L.J. 2093, 2093 (1992). 
39. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
947, 955 (1984). 
40. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472 (1923). 
41. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 253 (suggesting that workplace wellness programs 
often violate that normative principle). 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
The EEOC, the ADA, and Workplace Wellness Programs 
88 
statutes or court opinions. As a result, the normative work in determining 
what is voluntary tends to take place offstage. So it is with the ADA’s 
exception for voluntary medical inquiries that are part of an employee-
health program.42 The statute does not elaborate on what is “voluntary” in 
this context.43 In 2000, the EEOC issued enforcement guidance that sought 
to define the term: “A wellness program is ‘voluntary’ as long as an 
employer neither requires participation nor penalizes employees who do 
not participate.”44 That definition clearly rejected the libertarian free-
contract position—a position that would leave no work for the ADA’s 
voluntariness requirement, as conditions on employment would basically 
never be involuntary if we accepted the free-contract premise. 
But the EEOC’s guidance did not resolve the more difficult question of 
what kinds of incentives—short of firing or refusing to hire—vitiate 
voluntariness. Answering that question, under the EEOC’s definition, 
required deciding what it means to “penalize” employees who refuse to 
participate. But the concept of a penalty, too, is typically ambiguous and 
contested in the law and often depends on the same sorts of normative 
considerations that inform a determination whether a choice is voluntary. 
What constitutes a penalty for refusing to participate in a wellness 
program? One intuitive response is that a penalty is a negative incentive; 
penalties are thus to be distinguished from rewards, which are positive 
incentives. But this way of framing the question ends up, once again, just 
pushing off the normative inquiry to another place. It’s a classic baseline 
problem.45 If a penalty (impermissible) takes something away from you 
when you fail to take a particular action, and a reward (permissible) gives 
you something when you do take that action, we need to figure out the 
proper baseline against which to measure whether something has been 
taken away from you or given to you. 
 
42. Rebecca Greenfield, Employee Wellness Programs Not So Voluntary Anymore, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-15/employee-wellness-
programs-not-so-voluntary-anymore. 
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (1990) (Stating merely, “[a] covered entity may 
conduct voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories, 
which are part of an employee health program available to employees at that 
work site.”). 
44. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related 
Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC.GOV (July 27, 2000), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html. 
45. See Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31-38 (1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987). 
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A common approach to the baseline question is to look to legal 
entitlements.46 If one person offers another a choice between two 
outcomes, both of which would deprive the second person of a legal 
entitlement, that would render the choice involuntary. The paradigm case 
is, of course, “your money or your life.”47 But the prevalence of at-will 
employment in the United States would mean that a baseline of legal 
entitlements would provide no protection to most employees. “Sign up for 
the wellness program or you’re fired” gives at-will employees an option that 
would not deprive them of any legal entitlement because they have no 
entitlement to their job.48 The far more common proposition of “sign up for 
the wellness program or forgo the opportunity to earn some money” would 
seem at least as voluntary on this analysis—the lesser power included 
within the greater. But a law that prohibited employers from making 
medical inquiries as part of a wellness program unless participation was 
“voluntary” and then treated participation as voluntary as a matter of law 
whenever the workers were employed at will would do very little work. 
There is no reason to believe that the Congress that enacted the ADA 
intended for the provision to have such a minuscule scope. Nor would a 
reasonable reader understand the word “voluntary,” in this context, as 
imposing such a transparently thin requirement. 
A fair approach to the baseline problem requires looking beyond the 
prior legal entitlements of workers. One intuitive way of addressing the 
problem would be to focus on the express form that an offer takes. If an 
employer proposes to increase a worker’s base salary for participating in a 
wellness program, that would count as a reward, while if the employer 
proposed to decrease the base salary for refusing to participate, that would 
count as a penalty. The problem here should be obvious: employers 
generally have the managerial prerogative to set pay at whatever level they 
want, so long as they do not discriminate based on specifically forbidden 
factors such as race, sex, age, and disability. That basic fact makes a purely 
formal approach highly manipulable. To take a stylized example, an 
employer could set every employee’s salary at $30,000 but cut that amount 
by $1000 for employees who refuse to participate in a wellness program. 
Or the same employer could set every employee’s salary at $29,000 and 
augment that amount by $1000 for employees who agree to participate in 
the program. In terms of the financial cost to workers of refusing to 
participate in the wellness program, these two regimes are the same. 
 
46. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972). 
47. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 n.12 (2012) 
(“‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive proposition, whether you have a single 
dollar in your pocket or $500.”). 
48. See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive 
Character of American Labor Laws”, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 9–10 n.26 (1990). 
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Should they receive decisively different legal treatment simply because of 
the formal difference between them?49 
The argument that the formal difference should compel a different 
result would rely heavily on the phenomenon of loss aversion—”the idea 
that people tend to disfavor a loss from a given reference point more than 
they favor an equivalent gain.”50 An incentive that is framed as a threatened 
cut in pay will be, all else equal, more likely to lead to compliance than an 
incentive that is framed as a promised increase in pay.51 But that does not 
fully answer the question. For one thing, the effect on compliance will 
depend not just on the formal framing of the incentive—pay cut or pay 
increase—but, crucially, on its magnitude. It is easy to imagine that a 
promise to add $1000 to the pay of those who participate in a wellness 
program would lead to a greater uptake than a threat to cut fifty dollars 
from the pay of those who refuse. If all we care about is the likelihood of 
securing compliance, other factors are likely to be as important—and, in 
many cases, more important—than the formal framing of the incentive as 
an addition or cut to pay. 
And why is the likelihood of securing compliance what we care about? 
Employers adopt incentives—positive and negative—precisely because 
they hope that those incentives will encourage workers to participate in 
wellness programs.52 It is certainly possible to say that any incentive makes 
participation in such a program involuntary—that whatever else influences 
an employee’s decision whether to participate, an employer should not be 
able to put an additional thumb on the scale in favor of participation. But 
 
49. See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in 
A Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359, 1371-1374 (1984) (discussing 
“history as a baseline”). A related formal approach would use an employee’s 
existing salary as the base so that any offer of money beyond that salary counts 
as a record and any deduction from that salary counts as a penalty. Alternatively, 
one might use the salary an employee expected to be earing (taking into account 
any anticipated salary increase) as the base. These approaches would have all of 
the same problems articulated in the text, if not more. See infra note 51. 
50. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: 
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129 (1994); see generally Eyal 
Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 834-43 (2012). 
51. See generally Zamir, supra note 50, at 836. An employee’s reference point need 
not be the salary that the employer designates as the base rate of pay. It might be 
the salary the employee received immediately before the announcement of the 
wellness program, or it might be the salary the employee previously expected to 
be receiving (taking account of anticipated increases in pay) by the time the 
wellness program was put into effect. The empirical psychological literature 
suggests that employees might well adopt any of these possible reference points. 
The uncertainty in identifying which reference point employees will adopt in any 
particular context presents an additional difficulty in applying a formal positive-
incentive/negative-incentive distinction. But even if we could solve that difficulty, 
the more fundamental problem identified in the text would still exist. 
52. See, e.g., SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., INCENTIVES FOR WORKPLACE WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS (2015). 
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doing so requires an argument. And it cannot be an argument that is based 
on the mere fact that an incentive is successful. To determine whether the 
incentive renders a choice involuntary, we must ask not just whether the 
influence was effective, but whether it was effective in a way that was, in 
some way, normatively objectionable. 
The better way of reading the ADA’s voluntariness requirement for 
wellness programs, I would suggest, is that the requirement bars employers 
from imposing incentives that give an employee “no fair choice” but to 
participate.53 What “no fair choice” means is, of course, an open question.54 
But it is easy enough to suggest some guideposts that connect to basic 
purposes of the ADA. 
Starting with the most general point, the ADA is, in the relevant respect, 
a law mandating and limiting the terms of the employment relationship. 
Employment laws like the ADA necessarily reject the libertarian free-
contract premise that because workers can always seek another job we 
should not be concerned about the terms imposed by private employers.55 
This rejection reflects, in part, a conclusion that workers are, in general, 
asymmetrically vulnerable in the employment relationship—that it is 
generally much easier for an employer to find another worker than it is for 
an employee to find another job.56 It reflects a conclusion that the 
workplace itself is a location for the exercise of power with which the polity 
might properly be concerned—that the law appropriately limits the ways 
people with relatively more power treat others with relatively less, 
particularly in a relationship like employment that is so central to the day-
to-day lives of most adults.57 
These points come into sharper relief when we focus on the premises 
of employment laws, like the ADA, that prohibit discrimination. Laws 
prohibiting employment discrimination rest in part on the premise that 
integration is a positive value—that it is in society’s interest for workplaces 
to bring together people across all of the identity axes along which 
discrimination is prohibited.58 And they rest in part on the premise that 
members of disempowered groups—whether defined by race, sex, age, 
disability, or the other forbidden axes of discrimination—ought not to bear 
greater burdens than their fellow employees.59 In particular, if employers 
are permitted to discriminate and some employers do, then members of 
 
53. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How A Too-Clever Congress Could 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 520 (2003). 
54. See id. at 521 (calling this concept “amorphous”). 
55. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 39, at 951. 
56. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 238. 
57. Id. at 264. 
58. See ELIZABETH S. ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 22 (2010). 
59. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 228. 
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discriminated-against groups will typically receive lower wages from those 
employers who are willing to hire them. A key function of antidiscrimination 
laws is to put all workers, when compared across the forbidden axes of 
discrimination, on the same footing in dealing with their employers.60 
And recall the reason for the ADA’s prohibition on medical inquiries—
that those inquiries may reveal hidden disabilities and thus serve as an 
occasion for discrimination. When an employer conditions a payment on a 
worker’s agreement to provide medical information as part of a wellness 
program, an employee with a hidden disability faces a choice: reveal the 
information and place herself at risk of discrimination, or forgo a payment 
that her nondisabled coworkers can receive without putting themselves at 
similar risk. Seen in that way, the employer’s offer replicates paradigm 
situations that the ADA aimed to prevent—the driving out of workers with 
disabilities from particular workplaces and the suppression of their wages 
in the workplaces that would hire them. 
This analysis suggests a robust understanding of voluntariness in the 
context of the ADA’s medical-inquiry provisions. A monetary incentive for 
participating in a wellness program that requires employees to provide 
otherwise private medical information, in this view, should render the 
decision to participate involuntary. And that is precisely because such an 
incentive puts workers with disabilities to the type of choice from which the 
ADA was designed to protect them. It should not matter whether the 
incentive is formally positive (“Earn extra money if you give us your 
information”) or negative (“We’ll cut your pay if you don’t give us your 
information”), even if an incentive framed as a pay cut is more likely to lead 
workers to participate in the program. Nor should it matter whether the 
money at stake is a lot or a little, even though we can expect that workers 
will be more likely to participate in the program if more money is at stake. 
What should matter is the structure of the situation—that the worker with 
a disability must place herself at risk of discrimination or earn less money 
than the employer would otherwise pay her. If an employer paid 
nondisabled workers fifty dollars more per year than workers with 
disabilities, that would constitute impermissible discrimination. And if 
hiring discrimination by some employers had the overall effect of 
depressing disabled workers’ wages by fifty dollars per year, that would be 
a clear violation of the ADA notwithstanding the small monetary stakes. It 
is the structure of the incentive, not the size, that matters. 
III. The EEOC and Voluntariness in Wellness Programs 
In Part II, I argued that the best interpretation of the ADA’s 
voluntariness requirement would not permit employers to give workers any 
financial incentive to provide private health information as part of a 
 
60. See Rachel A. Spector, “Dignified Jobs at Decent Wages”: Reviving an Economic 
Equity Model of Employment Discrimination Law, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 123 
(2015) (providing a nice recent discussion). 
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wellness program. As I discuss in this Part, the EEOC has taken a 
dramatically different approach. The Commission’s 2016 wellness rules 
permit employers to impose large monetary costs, whether framed as 
rewards or penalties, on workers who refuse to provide their health 
information.61 I argue that the portions of the new regulations that permit 
those incentives should be invalidated. 
Controversies regarding the application of the ADA to wellness 
programs heated up significantly in the last few years of the Obama 
Administration. The immediate trigger was the EEOC’s filing of a set of 
lawsuits challenging the programs adopted by particular employers.62 
These lawsuits spurred a backlash from business interests, who heavily 
lobbied the White House to get the Commission—nominally an 
independent agency, but one made up of presidential appointees—to back 
off.63 After that lobbying effort, the EEOC announced its new regulations, 
which adopted an extremely loose standard of voluntariness.64 
It happened like this: in the late summer and early fall of 2014, the EEOC 
brought three well-publicized suits challenging employer wellness 
programs. The first of these cases, EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 
involved a wellness program in which participants were required to submit 
a health-risk assessment and other medical information.65 The EEOC alleged 
that the employer shifted the entire health-insurance-premium cost, 
including what would otherwise have been the employer’s share, onto 
those workers who refused to participate.66 The Commission also alleged 
that the employer had fired a worker who refused to participate.67 The 
second case, EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., involved similar allegations.68 
Participants in the employer’s wellness program were required to submit a 
health-risk assessment and undergo medical tests.69 If employees refused 
to participate, the employer canceled their health insurance and thus 
required them to pay for their own insurance without any employer 
 
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3) (2016). 
62. See Orion Energy Sys. Inc., 145 F. Supp. 3d at 841; Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 
at 849; Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2014 WL 5795481 at *2. 
63. See Sharon Begley, Exclusive: U.S. CEOs Threaten to Pull Tacit Obamacare Support 
Over “Wellness” Spat, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-wellness-exclusive-
idUSKCN0JD0AC20141129. 
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016). 
65. See Complaint, E.E.O.C. v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01019, at ¶ 11 (E.D. 
Wis., filed Aug. 20, 2014). 
66. See id. ¶¶ 16-18. 
67. See id. ¶ 20. 
68. See Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 851. 
69. See id. at 852. 
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contribution.70 Finally, in EEOC v. Honeywell, Inc., the Commission alleged 
that the employer imposed additional costs of up to $4000 on employees 
who refused to submit to biomedical testing as part of its wellness 
program.71 
These cases met mixed success at best. The district court granted 
summary judgment to the employer in Flambeau;72 the Seventh Circuit 
recently affirmed that judgment on procedural grounds without reaching 
the merits.73  The district court denied the EEOC’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction in Honeywell,74 and the EEOC did not pursue the case any further. 
The EEOC and Orion Energy recently settled their case.75 
But the voluntary-wellness cases in the EEOC’s 2014 trio were more 
important for the backlash they triggered than for the judgments the courts 
reached. Particularly after the EEOC filed the Honeywell case, business 
groups reacted harshly. They described the Commission’s actions as 
“outrageous,” as targeting popular wellness-plan features such as premium 
reductions for participation, and as creating a conflict between the ACA—
which allows quite significant financial incentives for wellness program 
participation—and the ADA—which, in the then-apparent view of the 
EEOC, did not.76 A number of these groups complained to the White House 
 
70. See id. 
71. Honeywell, 2014 WL 5795481 at *1-*2. 
72. See Flambeau, 131 F. Supp.3d at 852. See id. at 855 (holding the employer’s 
wellness program was protected under the ADA’s insurance safe-harbor 
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (Stating that the ADA “shall not be construed 
to prohibit or restrict,” among other things, an employer from “establishing, 
sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that 
are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that 
are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”); The court concluded that the 
wellness program was a term of the employer’s health insurance plan—because 
participating in the program was a condition of receiving insurance—and that the 
insurance plan underwrote, classified, or administered risks. See Flambeau, 131 F. 
Supp.3d at 855-856. Although engagement with that question would take me 
beyond the scope of this essay, it should be apparent that the Flambeau court’s 
decision reads the safe-harbor provision as creating a ready means of evading the 
ADA’s substantive provisions. The better reading of the safe-harbor provision, I 
would suggest, would interpret it as applying only to those plan rules that 
themselves underwrite, classify, or administer risks—and not to other practices 
that an employer decides to tie to receipt of health insurance. In this respect, my 
views largely accord with those of the EEOC. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,130-31,131. 
73. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
74. See Honeywell, 2014 WL 5795481 at 1*-2*. 
75. See EEOC, Wisconsin Employer Resolves EEOC Case Involving Wellness Program 
and Retaliation (Apr. 5, 2017) https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-
5-17a.cfm. 
76. Stephen Miller, EEOC’s Wellness Lawsuits Target Incentives, Spark Criticism, SOC’Y 
FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (Nov. 3, 2014), 
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and threatened to withhold any further support for the Affordable Care Act 
unless the EEOC changed its approach to this issue.77 
In the wake of this pressure, in April 2015, the EEOC issued proposed 
regulations addressing the application of the ADA to workplace-wellness 
programs.78 The Commission issued its final rule, which tracked the 
proposed rule in the relevant respects, in May 2016.79 That rule requires 
that any workplace wellness program “be reasonably designed to promote 
health or prevent disease.”80 It also provides a very specific definition of 
“voluntary” for determining whether medical inquiries associated with 
workplace health programs are permissible.81 To be voluntary, according to 
the EEOC’s new rules, the program may “not require employees to 
participate” or otherwise retaliate against employees in violation of the 
ADA;82 must provide to employees a written notice that informs them of 
what information will be obtained, the purposes for which that information 
will be used, and the privacy protections that will guard that information;83 
and may not deny health coverage or impose a cost that is greater than 
thirty percent of the total cost of self-only health insurance.84 The new 
regulations make clear that “the use of incentives (financial or in-kind) in an 
employee wellness program, whether in the form of a reward or penalty, 
will not render the program involuntary if the maximum allowable incentive 
available under the program” does not exceed the thirty percent 
threshold.85 
Because Congress explicitly gave the EEOC authority to issue 
regulations implementing the employment provisions of the ADA, the 
Commission’s new wellness rule will be controlling if it reflects a reasonable 
interpretation of the term “voluntary.”86 In Part II of this piece, I argued that 
 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/eeoc-sues-
honeywell.aspx. 
77. See Begley, supra note 63. 
78. See Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 
Fed. Reg. 21,659 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
79. See Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126 
(May 17, 2016). 
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(1) (2016). 
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016). 
82. Id. 
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(iv) (2016). 
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(ii), (3) (2016); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3). The self-only 
policy that to which the 30 percent factor is applied depends on whether the 
employer provides health coverage; if so, whether the employer offers more than 
one plan; and if so, whether the wellness program is limited to participants in a 
particular plan. 
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3) (2016) (emphasis added). 
86. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002). 
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the best interpretation of that term, in the context of the ADA’s provision 
addressing workplace health programs, would bar employers from 
providing any monetary incentive to reveal private medical information. If 
my argument is correct, that is a reason why the EEOC should not have 
adopted the definition of “voluntary” that it did in its recent regulations. 
But it is not, in and of itself, a reason to invalidate those regulations. It is 
hornbook administrative law—at least for now—that “if a statute is 
ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, 
Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the 
statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is 
the best statutory interpretation.”87 The question is not whether the EEOC’s 
wellness rule adopts the best interpretation of “voluntary,” but instead 
whether it adopts a reasonable one. 
Even with this standard in view, however, there are good arguments 
that the EEOC’s definition fails the test. According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the average annual premium for self-only coverage in the first 
half of 2015 was $6251.88 Thirty percent of that number is $1875.30. Note 
that the median household income in 2014 was just under $54,000, and 
forty percent of American households earned less than $42,000.89 Many 
workers would find it impossible to refuse to participate in a wellness 
program when so much money is at stake. And even the $1875.30 figure 
understates the cost that many employees will be required to pay under 
the new rule. The Kaiser Family Foundation notes that “as a result of 
differences in benefits, cost sharing, covered populations, and geographical 
location, premiums vary significantly around the averages for both single 
and family coverage.”90 For eighteen percent of covered workers, the self-
only premium in 2015 was $7501 or higher,91 which would mean that 
employers could impose a cost of $2250.30—or even more—on workers 
who refuse to provide their medical information. Forgoing so much money 
would be a significant burden for all but the most comfortable workers. 
Requiring workers to absorb such a cost to shield their private medical 
information would not be, in any reasonable sense, understood as a 
voluntary choice. 
Another way of looking at this issue is to consider the proportionate 
effect of a thirty-percent-of-coverage penalty on workers’ health insurance 
bills. In 2015, the average employee’s share of self-only coverage was 
 
87. Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980 (2005). 
88. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2015 
ANNUAL SURVEY (2015). 
89. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT 
POPULATION REPORTS, P60-252, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014 at 5 
(2015). 
90. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 88, at 1. 
91. Id. at 3. 
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eighteen percent of the total coverage cost.92 Allowing an employer to 
impose an additional thirty percent of the total cost on workers would more 
than double such an employee’s insurance bill. 
The Commission borrowed the thirty-percent rule from HIPAA and the 
Affordable Care Act, which state that a health-contingent wellness program 
can impose incentives of up to thirty percent of the total cost of self-only 
coverage (fifty percent if the goal of the program is smoking cessation).93 
The EEOC’s regulations extend that rule to participatory wellness 
programs.94 Notably, HIPAA and the Affordable Care Act do not state that a 
thirty-percent-of-coverage penalty is consistent with voluntariness; they 
merely state that those two statutes do not prohibit employers from 
imposing such a penalty on nonparticipating employees.95 Nor do HIPAA 
and the ACA preempt other federal regulation of wellness programs. To the 
contrary, as the EEOC specifically recognized, the final ACA wellness 
regulations specifically “recognize that compliance with HIPAA’s 
nondiscrimination rules (as amended by the Affordable Care Act), including 
the wellness program requirements, is not determinative of compliance 
with any other provision of any other state or federal law, including, but not 
limited to, the ADA.”96 Taken together, HIPAA and the ACA on the one hand 
and the ADA on the other impose two relevant requirements on workplace 
wellness programs: (1) health-contingent programs may not impose a 
penalty that exceeds thirty percent of the total cost of coverage or they will 
violate the first two statutes, and (2) even if they satisfy that first 
requirement, wellness programs of whatever type may not make medical 
examinations or inquiries unless they are voluntary. 
Because the ADA, unlike HIPAA and the ACA, imposes a voluntariness 
requirement and because the ADA’s requirements stand independently of 
the requirements of HIPAA and the ACA, the burden on the Commission 
was to explain how the thirty percent rule was consistent with workers 
making a voluntary choice to provide their medical information. Yet neither 
the EEOC’s regulation itself nor the preamble to that regulation made any 
attempt to explain why a choice made in the face of a threat to impose such 
a large financial cost on nonparticipants is voluntary.97 To be sure, the 
Commission repeatedly asserted that the thirty-percent rule ensures that 
the choice to participate is voluntary. But it never engaged with the 
questions of how much burden a thirty-percent-of-coverage penalty will 
 
92. Id. at 84. 
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2010). 
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3)(i) (2016). 
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2010). 
96. 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,128 (citing 78 Fed. Reg. at 33168). 
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2016). 
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impose on workers and whether those workers will realistically be able to 
refuse to participate in the face of such a large penalty.98 
Instead, the Commission’s only engagement with the relevant 
questions, if it can be called that, came in a series of ipse dixit statements.99 
The Commission asserted that it had concluded “that allowing certain 
incentives related to wellness programs, while limiting them to prevent 
economic coercion that could render provision of medical information 
involuntary, is the best way to effectuate the purposes of the wellness 
program provisions of both” the ADA and HIPAA.100 The Commission also 
announced that it had 
decided that by extending the 30 percent limit set under HIPAA and 
the Affordable Care Act to include participatory wellness programs 
that ask an employee to respond to a disability-related inquiry or 
undergo a medical examination, this rule promotes the ADA’s 
interest in ensuring that incentive limits are not so high as to make 
participation in a wellness program involuntary.101 
And: “Nonetheless, although substantial, the Commission concludes 
that, given current insurance rates, offering an incentive of up to 30 percent 
of the total cost of self-only coverage does not, without more, render a 
wellness program coercive.”102 But the Commission made no effort to 
explain the basis for these conclusions. Surely many workers would find a 
penalty of nearly $2000—one that more than doubles their health-
insurance bill—to be one that imposes “economic coercion that could 
render provision of medical information involuntary,” for example.103 The 
EEOC made no effort to explain why employees would not experience such 
a penalty as coercive or under what conception of voluntariness such a 
penalty would not be coercive. Because the EEOC did not explain how its 
thirty-percent rule connected to the textual meaning of “voluntary” or any 
of the normative considerations that underlie the application of that term, 
the new rule hardly counts as an interpretation of the statutory term at all. 
It is more apt to call the rule an agency announcement that certain practices 
will satisfy the statute. 
Under standard principles of administrative law, the EEOC’s series of 
ipse dixit statements is insufficient to justify the Commission’s new thirty-
 
98. See id. 
99. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Rules and Regulations: 
Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,126-31 
(May 17, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 1630). 
100. Id. at 31129. 
101. Id. at 31132. 
102. Id. at 31133. 
103. Id. at 31129. 
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percent rule.104 Agencies are required to “provide a reasoned explanation” 
for new policies.105 The “reasoned explanation” cannot “rest[ ] on reasoning 
divorced from the statutory text.”106 At least as judged by the Commission’s 
contemporaneous statements—the only proper basis for evaluating an 
agency action107—the EEOC’s thirty percent rule scarcely rested on 
reasoning at all, and it certainly did not rest on reasoning connected to the 
statutory text. Just last term, the Supreme Court invalidated a Department 
of Labor rule in which the agency supported its interpretation merely by ex 
cathedra pronouncement rather than “by explaining why that policy ‘is 
more consistent with statutory language’ than alternative policies.”108 The 
EEOC’s adoption of the thirty-percent rule for determining the 
voluntariness of a wellness program’s requirement to provide medical 
information should fall for the same reasons. 
IV. Conclusion 
My goals in this essay have been twofold. First, I have defended what I 
take to be the best interpretation of the ADA’s voluntariness requirement 
for medical inquiries that are part of workplace health programs. Under 
that interpretation, an employer would not be permitted to give any 
financial incentive—whether framed as a penalty or a reward—to 
encourage workers to provide their private medical information. Second, I 
have argued that the EEOC’s 2016 Wellness Rule not only fails to adopt the 
best interpretation of “voluntary” but does not even adopt a reasonable 
interpretation of that term. Accordingly, the thirty-percent rule should be 
invalidated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104. E.g., F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
105. E.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). 
106. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007). 
107. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127. 
108. Id. (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 175 (2007)); see 
also id. (noting that the Department “stated only that it would not treat service 
advisors as exempt because ‘the statute does not include such positions and the 
Department recognizes that there are circumstances under which the 
requirements for the exemption would not be met’” and that it “continued that it 
‘believes that this interpretation is reasonable’ and ‘sets forth the appropriate 
approach’”) (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. 18,838 (April 5, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R 
§ 779.372(c)(1)). 
